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Tariffs and Saving in a Model with New Families 
ABSTRACT 
The paper explores how a tariff may affect saving through 
intergenerational redistribution of income that is caused by changes in factor 
prices and by the distribution of tariff revenue. The model is a 
Blanchard-type overlapping generations model. Two types of revenue 
distribution schemes are examined -- lump-sum distribution of current revenues 
to currently living individuals, and distribution as a subsidy to holders of 
physical wealth. (There is no fiscal policy in this paper -- the government 
budget is continuously balanced). We draw some general conclusions about the 
non-neutralities that arise in this type of model as opposed to 
single-generation models, or mode1~ in which perfect bequest motives exist. 
1. Introduction 
In policy discussions, it is often suggested that increased tariffs will 
improve a country's current account. To the economic theorist, it is not 
immediately obvious how a distortionary tax change should affect the 
incentives to save and invest -- whose difference comprises a current accotmt 
imbalance. Here we take a look at one aspect of the effect of ontariffs 
saving in a neoclassical model. 
This paper analyzes the effects of tariffs on saving in a small open 
economy using the uncertain lifetimes version of the overlapping generations 
model, developed by Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1984, 1985), Several authors 1 
have used this model to examine the role of public sector budget deficits 
because it fails to display Ricardian debt-neutrality, so that the 
intertemporal pattern of net lump-sum transfers to individuals has real 
effects. We examine the intertemporal effects of a permanent tariff change, 
abstracting from other aspects of fiscal policy. The distribution of the 
incidence of the tariff across different factors, and the method of 
distribution of the tariff revenue, have important consequences for aggregate 
per capita saving and, therefore, the current account. The intersectoral 
and intergenerational effects of the tariff have intertemporal impacts for the 
See Blanchard ( 1984, 1985). In the international context, see Buiter 
(1986a,b,c), Frenkel and Razin (1986), Kouri (1986), van Wijnbergen (1985), 
Eaton (1987), Smith (1987) and our earlier paper, Engel and Kletzer (1986), 
See also Weil (1985). 
1 
1 
same reason that debt-neutrality fails; however we constrain the public sector 
budget to be in balance continuously. 2 
After laying out the model in section 2, we proceed by examining first a 
special case of the model in which the import good is not produced. 
domestically. Tariff revenue is assumed to be redistributed. lump-sum to 
living individuals. We find that under this distribution scheme, the change 
in the tariff has consequences for aggregate saving. The tariff is 
essentially an equal tax on both physical wealth and non-tangible wealth, 
while the lump-sum redistribution is a subsidy only to non-tangible wealth. 
When the incidence of the tariff cum subsidy scheme is not neutral across 
generations, total expenditure in this economy is affected because of the 
imperfect claim of currently living individuals on income from non-tangible 
assets in the future. 
We next take up models in which the import good is produced. Here, a 
change in the tariff has additional effects on expenditure through its power 
to change the factoral distribution of income. 
It is important to note that these effects are different than those that 
appear in other models of the current account in which no new generations are 
born. (In fact, both of these effects are present even when the tariff would 
have no effect on saving in a model with a single generation.) 3 As we will 
show, the fact that new generations are born with an imperfect bequest motive 
2 Our analysis of the distributional impact of taxes bears some resemblance 
to that of Chamley and Wright (1987). 
3 This general feature of the uncertain lifespans model has also been noted 
by Buiter ( 1986b). 
2 
means that even a small tariff will alter saving. These effects occur even in 
the absence of any first-order distortion, or presence of a "pure substitution 
effect". 4 
In section 4, we consider an alternative scheme for redistribution of 
tariff revenue. If the economy has positive holdings of tangible assets 
(foreign currency bonds and land), the revenue is redistributed as a subsidy 
to tangible assets. If there are net negative holdings of tangible assets, 
the revenue is redistributed as a subsidy to net tangible debt. We show that 
for any given level of the tariff, the government has a choice of how to 
redistribute revenue. If they choose to subsidize steady-state tangible 
assets, the steady-state tangible asset position will be positive. If they 
choose to have a negative subsidy rate to steady-state tangible assets -­
hence, a positive subsidy to steady-state tangible debt -- the economy will 
have a negative position in tangible assets in steady state. Thus, by 
choosing how to set the subsidy rate for any given tariff rate, the government 
can determine the net position in tangible assets in steady state for the 
economy. We then show how changes in the tariff rate affect saving. 
Section 5 concludes. 
4 See for example Razin and Svensson (1983), Edwards ( 1987) and the 
endogenous discount rate model in our earlier paper, Engel and Kletzer (1986). 
There are first-order effects in Razin and Svensson because the consumers' 
price indices are allowed to change from period to period. We rule this out 
in our model. Edwards also introduces non-traded goods. 
3 
2. The Model 
We study a small country that takes as given the world interest rate, r, 
and the world price of good 2 in terms of good 1, which we set equal to one. 
Both goods are traded and consumed. We consider the effects of increasing a 
tariff on good 2. 
Goods are produced using standard neoclassical production processes. 
There are at least two factors of production, so factor returns and output 
levels are determined exactly. All factor supplies are constant (there are no 
intermediate goods, and all non-labor factors can be considered to be types of 
land) and are normalized to one. With unchanging factor supplies and relative 
price of commodities, factor returns and output levels are constant over time. 
A permanent change in the tariff may lead to a once and for all shift in 
factor prices and production levels. The production side of the economy can 
be left in this general form for the dynamic analysis, although we will 
compare the effect of a permanent tariff change for three special cases: only 
the export good is produced; both goods are produced in the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model; and, both goods are produced in the specific-factors model. 
Household consumption behavior is derived using the uncertain lifetimes 
version of the overlapping generations model, developed by Yaari (1965) and 
Blanchard (1984,1985). We adopt a continuous-time version in which each 
individual faces a constant (age and time independent) instantaneous 
probability of death, rr, less than unity, and there is no bequest motive. At 
each instant, a new cohort of size rr+n is born, where n is the constant 
proportionate rate of population growth. The dynamics of per-capita saving 
are identical for all values of rr +n that exceed zero (see Buiter ( 1986c) ) . 
4 
Weil (1985) shows that an overlapping generations model results when n is zero 
and n is positive. In a model with infinitely-lived dynastic families in 
which each individual possesses a perfect bequest motive, if there is birth of 
new dynasties, then the model will lead to the same saving dynamics as in 
Weil, because currently living families do not care about the consumption of 
future dynasties. We use Blanchard's version in which n is positive and n 
equals zero, because labor force growth is unessential to our examination of 
the savings effects of tariff changes. Therefore, the population is constant 
with size equal to one. 
Because consumers have uncertain lifetimes, their effective subjective 
discount rate is o+n, where o is the positive pure rate of time preference. 
All forms of physical wealth are perfect substitutes, so that they earn 
the same rate of return, r, as an internationally traded bond. We assume that 
consumers have access to a perfect annuities market. Each consumer can 
contract with an insurance company to receive an additional rate of return rr 
on tangible assets while she lives. In exchange, the company receives her net 
wealth if she dies. Conversely, if a consumer has negative net holdings of 
tangible assets, then she agrees to pay a premium n per unit of debt on the 
condition that the insurance company assumes her debt upon death. 
Two types of wealth are assumed not transferable to the insurer for an 
annuity. The consumer's human wealth (the discounted value of labor income) 
has no value upon death, so that the company is unwilling to pay anything for 
the privilege of owning this asset after the person's death. Also, since 
tariff revenue is distributed only to living persons, the individual has no 
claim to tariff revenue after death to transfer to the insurer. We refer to 
the sum of these two types of wealth as non-tangible assets. 
5 
In the Yaari-Blanchard model, an individual born at time i will maximize 
the expectation of the discounted stream of felicity of current consumption. 
The objective function for an individual born at time i is given by: 
00 




. (s) )e ds 
1 t 1 1 
where c i (s), c i (s) are individual i's consumption at times of goods 1 and1 2 
2, respectively. The individual's budget constraint at time tis 
(2 ) wit= (r+n)wit +wit+ Rit - 1it' 
wit is tangible wealth. 5 Income from non-tangible wealth. is given by the sum 
of labor income, wit' and net transfers, Rit' Expenditure at domestic prices 
on consumables is denoted by Iit' which equals the sum c 1i (t) + pc i (t), where2 
pis the domestic (cum tariff) price of good 2. The details of the derivation 
of individual and aggregate consumption dynamics are given in the Appendix. 
We make the assumptions that the felicity function, u(c
1 
,c ), is homothetic2 
and displays constant relative risk aversion to allow linear aggregation of 
individuals' consumption plans. 
An important feature of the Yaari-Blanchard model is that the pure 
subjective rate of discount need not equal the world rate of interest to 
assure convergence of aggregate per capita. wealth and consumption to steady 
state values under individual intertemporal optimization. Because individuals 
face a positive probability of death at each instant, aggregate per capita 
wealth can converge to a finite level when r exceeds 8 , even though each 
individual plans to accumulate unbounded. wealth over an infinite horizon (and 
The"·" above a letter refers to its time derivative. 
6 
5 
analogously, when o exceeds r). Individuals born at any given time comprise 
an exponentially decreasing fraction of the population as they age (in Weil 
(1985), this happens through population growth alone). The appendix restates 
Blanchard's condition for existence and stability of the steady state. 
Output of the two goods is given by yl and y2 . Aggregate consumption is 
represented by c 1 and c 2. Total expenditure at domestic prices is given by 
Total expenditure at world prices is 
Tariff revenue in the aggregate is given by 
The aggregate lump-sum transfer to consumers at time t, Rt' equals the actual 
tariff revenue collected at time t. We assume a continuously balanced public 
sector budget. Because felicity is homothetic, the age distribution of total 
revenue has no consequences if the transfer is lump-sum and received only by 
those currently alive. 
The aggregate value of non-tangible wealth (aggregating as in Blanchard) 
is given by: 
(The wage rate is age independent so that 0 depends only on rand p for the 
small country, and rand p do not change -- except for the one time permanent 
change in p from the tariff.) 
Aggregate tangible wealth, wt, is defined by 
7 
bt is aggregate net claims on foreigners. at is the value of land. Under the 
constant returns to scale production assumption, 
( 3) 
Therefore, at depends only on the paths of p and r. 
Aggregate consumption at any time t is given by the simple linear 
relationships (see the Appendix): 
(4) 
clt = (1 - ry(p))It' and 
where 
11 = r + rr + (o - r) /a , 
and O ::c; ry ;s; 1; ry' (p) ~ O. 
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by a. 
Aggregating as in Blanchard yields equations for accumulation of tangible 
and non-tangible assets: 
( 5) 
and, 
( 6) N = (r+rr)N - (0 + R ).t t t 
Note that tariff revenues may be expressed as 
where 
8 




In what fallows, we will generally asstm1e a' > 0. This would hold, for 
example, with Cobb-Douglas utility (77' (p) = 0). It could be violated if the 
demand elasticity of substitution between goods is sufficiently high and 
initial tariff levels are sufficiently greater than zero. 
The tangible wealth acctm1ulation equation can be rewritten as 
(7) 
. .
Since at is constant over time, bt = wt. Also note that 
(8) 
Equations (3) , ( 7) and ( 8) may be used to derive 
(9) 
Equations (4), (5), (7) and (8) give the dynamics of expenditure at world 
prices: 
(10) 
(Remember, at is constant.) 
Equations (9) and ( 10) constitute a second order dynamic system that 
expresses the motion of the economy. 
The steady-state levels of z and b can be obtained by setting b = 0 in 
equation (9) and z = 0 in equation (10). We get6 ' 7 
6 
A - over a variable represents its steady-state value. 
7 
The stability condition implies (il-r) (r+11) - at-.11 > 0, and t-. > r > 0. So, 






(12) '6 = 
r 
The appendix shows the conditions under which the dynamic system is 
saddle stable. The accumulation of bonds over time is given by 
(13) 
where 0 < 0 is the stable root of the system. 
3. Effects of Tariff Changes 
Here we examine the effects of increasing the tariff permanently at some 
time. We are particularly interested in the response of saving and the 
current account. At the moment the tariff is imposed, the country's claims on 
foreigners, bt, cannot jump. So, from equation (13), the effect of an 
increase in tariffs on saving and the current account, starting from a 
position of steady state is given by (recall the assumption that a' > 0) 
(14) 
10 
which has the same sign as db/da. 8 
a. Specialization in Production of the Export Good 
In the case in which the import good (good 2) is not produced, the wage 
rate, w, and the value of land, a, are unaffected by changes in the tariff. 
Output of good 2, y2 , is zero, and output of good 1 will not respond to tariff 
movements. 
From equation (12) 
(15) db/da = (1/r)(dz/da). 
From (11), 
(16) dz/da = a [ ( 1'1- r ) ( r +n ) - 2 0 as r <
> o.al'! 7T] 
Hence, from ( 14) , ( 15) and ( 16) it follows that an increase in tariffs will 
improve the current account (increase saving) when the personal discount rate 
is less than the world interest rate, but will worsen the current account 
(lower saving) when the discount rate exceeds the world interest rate. 
8 
If we are initially away from steady state, db/da = -0 (db/da) + 
(b-b)d0/da. From the expression fore in the appendix, d0/da = An((A+n) 2 
4aAn)-112 > O. If initially the current account is in deficit, so (b-b) > 0, 
then the effect of a tariff increase on the current account is more positive 
relative to a starting position of current account balance, and vice-versa for 
a current account initially in surplus. 
11 
It is useful to pursue this from a different tack to develop intuition. 
From equation (9) 
Hence 
dzJda = (0/r)(dz/da). 
When long-run expenditure z rises, current expenditure, zt, falls. An 
increase in the tariff will cause zt to rise when 5 >rand fall when r > 8. 
From equation (4) 
ctI 
t 
/da = ~ dN 
t /da. 
Nt will change when the tariff rises because the discounted value of tariff 
revenue will increase. This value depends on the expected amount of change in 
expenditure currently and in the future. The appendix demonstrates that 
starting from steady state 
0(0-r) 
r > o. 
So, dit/da > 0. Expenditure measured in domestic goods prices necessarily 
increases as the tariff rises. 
Now zt = It - Rt' under complete specialization. Clearly if r > 8, the 
increase in tariff revenue exceeds the increase in It (so zt falls), and when 
o > r, the increase in It exceeds the increase in tariff revenue. 
It is very helpful to consider the special case of free trade initially. 
Then, 
We also have 
12 
d.NJda = I/(r + 1l), 
which simply equals the discmmted value of a permanent increase in tariff 
revenue equal to today's increase. We can write 
So 
6 - r 6-r 
= (r + n + dN /daa = ( 1 + a( r+n) ) dR/da.t 
When o > r (r > 8) the marginal propensity to consume out of pennanent income 
is greater than (less than) one, and 
8-r 
= = a(r+n) I. 
In the complete specialization model, a tariff increase leads to an 
increase in spending in terms of domestic prices. The tariff revenue 
generates future income (in terms of domestic prices) and, therefore, 
increases the value of non-tangible wealth. If the increase in spending falls 
short of the increase in current tariff revenue (8 < r) , saving and the 
current account increase, but if the increase in spending exceeds the increase 
in current revenue (8 > r), saving and the current account decline. 
In moo.els in which no new families are born and there is a perfect 
bequest motive, if there were no distortions in the economy (such as existing 
tariffs) a small increase in tariffs would have no effect on expenditure 
(except possibly through a "pure substitution effect" which is ruled out here 
13 
by our assumptions on preferences) . 9 It is important to note that in this 
model even when the initial tariff is zero, a small increase in tariffs has a 
first order effect on expenditure. 
Consider for a moment a scheme for redistributing tariff revenue that 
makes the imposition of a tariff neutral. Since tariff revenue is 
proportional to expenditure measured in terms of the domestic good, I, a 
subsidy to expenditure clearly would neutralize the effect of the tariff. In 
this case we know 
But, then using equation (8), we would have 
Tariff revenue would be given by 
Notice that in this case the tariff is effectively a proportional tax on total 
wealth (wt + Nt) at the rate (a/( 1-a) )i'.. The tariff is neutral when the 
9 See Engel and Kletzer (1986) for a demonstration of this in a model with 
a representative consumer who has an infinite horizon and an endogenous rate 
of time preference. Ra.zin and Svensson ( 1983) discuss a "pure substi tut ion 
effect" that is ruled out by assurnption in this model. Because the felicity 
function is identical in all periods, and prices are constant, the exact price 
index does not change over time in our set-up. 
14 
revenue is rebated as a proportional subsidy to total wealth.lo 
In contrast, under the lump-st.nn redistribution to living persons 
considered in this section, the tariff is still a proportional tax on total 
wealth: 
Rt = a.ti (wt + Nt) , 
but the revenue is returned purely as a subsidy to non-tangible wealth. The 
tariff changes consumption because the redistribution scheme has first-order 
effects on expenditure. 
When there is a permanent increase in the tariff, total wealth is taxed 
at a greater rate both now and in the future. The tax on tangible wealth is a 
fully-capitalized loss to living individuals (because of the perfect annuities 
market). The losses from the tax on future non-tangible wealth are only 
partially capitalized by living individuals. A neutral redistribution scheme 
would be to return the revenue in an equal subsidy to tangible and 
non-tangible wealth. Any other scheme has consequences for total expenditure 
measured at world prices. For example, the lump-sum redistribution considered 
in this section takes revenue from taxes on tangible and non-tangible wealth 
and redistributes it purely as a subsidy to non-tangible assets. In section 4 
we consider another non-neutral scheme in which the revenue is redistributed 
10 Under the "neutral" scheme, the level of c
1 
and c2 will change (because 
the tariff is a tax on c 2, but all e:xl'.)enditure is subsidized). However, c 1 + 
c 2 (=z) will not be affected. Of course, expenditure in domestic prices 
changes as (p-1 ) c
2 
is altered, but this is exactly the change in tariff 
revenue. 
15 
11 as a subsidy to tangible assets. 
In this section, both forms of wealth are being taxed by the tariff but 
the revenue is all corning back as a lump-sum transfer. In the future, that 
revenue (which will be generated partially by a tax on physical assets and 
partially by a tax on non-tangible assets) will be redistributed to all 
individuals who are alive at that time -- some of whom are not yet born. 
Thus, living individuals are not fully compensated for the burden of the tax 
they bear. The only neutral scheme would give 
as a lumJrsum redistribution to individuals living at any time only that share 
of the revenue collected that is effectively a tax on non-tangible wealth. 
With lump-sum redistribution of revenues, the burden of the tax is not spread 
across generations in the same way as the redistribution of the revenue -­
which causes the pattern of saving to change across generations. 
b. Both Goods Produced 
In addition to the effect on saving generated by redistribution of tariff 
revenue, there is an effect on total expenditure caused by changes in the 
factor cornposition of income. In a model where both the export and import 
good are produced domestically, and there are at least two factors of 
production, the change in the domestic relative price of the goods has 
implications for spending levels. In particular, if the tariff adjusts the 
Eaton ( 1987) considers a similar model, but one in which there are 




size of income derived from tangible versus non-tangible f onns of wealth, 
aggregate saving may be altered. 
This effect is separate from any impact the tariff may have on saving by 
decreasing the total value of output at world prices from the distortionary 
effects of non-lump-sum truces. To make this point most forcefully, we will 
first consider a small tariff starting from a point of free trade, so that 
distortions are second-order small. Thus, this effect is not present in those 
models with no new families and perfect bequest motives. 
It is useful to note from equation (3) above that the value of land, at' 
can be expressed as 
(17) 
The value of land equals the value of output at world prices less the value of 
the output of labor and the value of the tariff distortion of output. 
Also, note that non-tangible wealth can be expressed as 
(l)(J (p-l)y2
(18) + Jare-(r+rr)(s-t)ds.Nt = r+n r+n 
t s 
From equation (4), expenditure at domestic prices, It' is proportional to 
the Sl.ll'Il of tangible and non-tangible wealth. Examination of equations (17) 
and ( 18) reveal how a change in tariffs will affect It . In the previous 
section we saw the effects of a permanent tariff increase on the Sl.ll'Il of the 
discounted values of future aI . But here there is an additional effect thats 
comes from changes in <.J - (p-l)y
2 
. For example, if the tariff raises the wage 
rate (in terms of the exportable), the value of non-tangible wealth increases 
by (1/(r+n)) times the change in the wage. However, the value of land falls 
by (1/r) times the change in the wage. The total effect of a given increase 
17 
in wages on wealth and spending is negative, because the social discount rate 
that values the flow of income from tangible assets, r, is less than the 
corresponding interest rate for non-tangible assets, r+n. The future changes 
in the product of land are fully capitalized into the current value of land 
(because of the perfect annuities market), but future changes in wage income 
are not (because in the future the labor force will consist only partly of 
those living now, and partly of some who are not currently alive) . Unlike 
models where agents have infinite lives, a change in the source of factor 
income has implications for the total value of wealth. 
A simple expression can be derived for the change in It when tariffs 
increase, starting from initially free trade. Note, first, in this case 
We then have 
The first term in this expression is identical to the one discussed at length 
in the previous section, and the second term corresponds to the effect 
explained in the preceding paragraph. (Note that there is no change in y +
1 
Yz if we start at free trade and have an infinitesimal increase in the tariff 
rate.) The change in expenditure at world prices, zt' which in this case 
equals the negative of the change in saving and the current account, is given 
by: 
dz/dp = [ (o-r)a' /a(r+n) JI - [nfi./r(r+n)] (dw/dp - y ).
2 
The change in expenditure depends on how wages in terms of the export 
good change, but the size and direction of this movement depends upon the 
18 
production structure. In a Heckscher-Ohlin set-up, in which both goods are 
produced with intersectorally mobile land and labor, the rate will rise if the 
protected sector is labor-intensive and fall if that sector is land-intensive. 
The value of land will rise if the protected sector is land-intensive, and 
conversely if the protected sector is labor-intensive. The size of these 
effects also depends upon the exact production function. Thus, taking into 
account the effects of tariffs on factor prices makes the response of saving 
to tariffs ambiguous. 
In a specific-factors model in which labor is free to move between 
sectors, but other factors cannot, the increase in the tariff will raise the 
wage in terms of the export good. The value of land in the export sector will 
decline, and the value of land in the import sector will rise. Again, the 
total effect of the tariff on saving is ambiguous. 
The general ex-press ion for the change in saving starting from a position 
in which a tariff was already in place is given by: 
db _ - ea rq r - 8 }a' [ c..> - ( p - 1 ) y 
2
1 0(1-a)dn de..> dy
2
dp - a[ (a-r) (r+·1l) - adnJ 2 r[(d-r)(r+n) - adn) [-y2+dp-(p-l)dp J 
In general, the sign of this derivative is indeterminate. 
19 
4. Alternate Redistribution Scheme 
In the previous section, all tariff revenue was redistributed as lump-sum 
transfers to the currently alive. This scheme has the effect of increasing 
the value of non-tangible wealth (for the "usual" case in which a rises with 
the tariff rate). An interesting alternative is the redistribution of tariff 
revenue in the form of a subsidy to tangible assets. In this section, we 
consider the remittance of all current tariff revenue through a linear subsidy 
to holdings of tangible wealth. This scheme is identical to a reduction of 
the tax on non-wage income (interest and rents) financed by the tariff 
increase in a model with a more complex fiscal policy in place. 
To isolate the effect of the change in the redistribution plan, we assume 
that the country is completely specialized in production of the exportable. 
The tariff revenue is redistributed in proportion to each living individual's 
tangible wealth, so that the aggregate transfer is 1\wt' where !\ is the 
proportionate rate. The effective market return on these assets becomes r + n 
+ Bt > O. 
Total tariff revenue is given by art, where a is as previously defined. 
The balanced budget requirement implies that 
{19) a.rt = !\wt' 
at all times. While a is a constant for a fixed tariff rate, B will vary with 
rand w. Therefore, the model is now non-linear. 
In the Blanchard model, net holdings of tangible assets, wt' can assume 
20 
negative values. This can happen if total foreign indebtedness exceeds the 
total value of land. In order to satisfy equation (19), clearly Bt must be 
negative in these cases, since a and It are always positive. Hence, fit< 0 <=+ 
wt < 0, and 8 t > 0 ~ wt > 0. 
The dynamics of aggregate tangible wealth and consumption expenditure 
valued in world prices are given by (see Appendix): 
(20) 
(21) 
where At is defined by 
00 
_1 J f: [ ( r-6 ) / a - (r+n ) ] + ( {1-a ) / a )8 (u)du 
ilt = e ds. 
t 
Using (19) and recalling that zt = (1-a.)It, equation (20) becomes. 
(22) 
Equations ( 21) and ( 22) are a dynamic system in two variables. The 
appendix demonstrates the conditions under which this system is saddle stable. 
An equation for the accumulation of foreign bonds near steady state is given 
by 
As discussed at the beginning of section 3, the change in saving and the 
current account in response to a tariff increase, starting from steady state, 
has the same sign as the change in b, the long run position in international 
bonds. 
Setting z =0 and w =0, steady-state tangible wealth is given by: 
21 
(r+B-o)/a
(23) w = 
(r+n+B)(n-(r+B-6)/a) 
The stability conditions imply (11 - ( r+B-o )/a) > 0, so w> 0 ~ r+iJ-o > 0 and w< 
O # r+B-8 < O. From the discussion above, this implies B > 0 # r+B-6 >O and B 
< 0 # r+B -8 < 0. More will be said about this presently. 
Because only the export good is produced, the tariff will not change the 




This result is entirely plausible -- an increase in the subsidy to tangible 
wealth increases the steady-state holdings of that type of wealth in the form 
of foreign bonds. We need to investigate how B changes when the tariff 
increases to understand the effects of tariffs on the current account. In 
those cases in which an increase in p causes lJ to rise, saving and the current 
account will rise, and when an increase in pleads to a decrease in i'J, saving 
and the current account decline. 
Solving for relation (19) in steady state yields a quadratic relationship 
between a and B: 
(25) anA = [j ( ( r +iJ - 8) /a) , 
where, 
A = (r + n + i3 - (r + B - o )/a ) . 
This implies that the constraint ( 19) does not determine B uniquely for any 
tariff rate. For any given a, there are two choices for 8 that satisfy (19). 
This is perhaps easiest to understand in the case in which there is no 
tariff. Clearly B = 0 satisfies the government budget constraint. But it is 
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also true that B = o - r will ensure a balanced budget in steady-state. Such 
a choice will lead steady-state wealth to be zero, so total subsidies will 
also be zero. 
We can derive an expression for local derivatives of B with respect to a: 
(26) dB/da = nX 2/[ (X-73) (r+B-cS )/a + 73 (r+n+B )/a]. 
By the stability condition, X- ~ > 0. Recalling that when 73 is positive when 
r + B - o is positive, then the derivative is positive if B is positive and 
conversely. 
Figure 1 shows the relation between a and /J when r > cS • This country 
would have positive steady-state holdings of tangible assets in the absence of 
any subsidy to wealth or debt. When a is zero (p = 1), Bis either zero or is 
negative (= o - r). For positive values of a., there is always a positive B 
that satisfies the government budget constraint (the top half of the graph). 
If this Bis chosen, then clearly r + B - o is greater than zero, and steady 
state w is positive. But it is also true for all positive values of a there 
is a negative value of B < o -r which satisfies equation (19). In this case, 
r + B - o < O, and steady-state foreign debt exceeds the value of land (w is 
negative). Here the tariff revenue is rebated as a subsidy to negative 
holdings of tangible wealth. 
Figure 2 takes up the case in which in the absence of subsidies the 
country would be long-run debtors in tangible wealth -- that is, the case in 
which cS > r. If a is zero, Bis either zero or o - r > 0. Again, for any 
positive value of a there is a positive value of fi that satisfies the balanced 
budget requirement. In this case 73 > 8 - r, which implies that r + B- cS > 0, 





that sets total subsidies equal to total tariff revenue. For these choices of 
B, r + R - o < 0, and w< 0. 
The government can always choose a value of fl to ensure that long-nm 
foreign debt is less than the value of land (w > 0) if it so chooses (and 
vice-versa if it wants w< 0). It can do so by altering the rate of return on 
tangible assets available to residents. (This ultimately means changing the 
country's international debt position, since in the aggregate the value of 
land holdings cannot be altered.) Perhaps the surprising thing is that it can 
always choose such a subsidy rate and keep the budget balanced irrespective of 
the relation of o tor. 
Using equations (24) and (26) we can see how the current account must 
change as tariffs. increase. Not surprisingly, when B is positive, so w is 
positive, an increase in the tariff will increase the subsidy to tangible 
wealth and therefore increase current saving and the current account. 
Likewise, when 73 is negative, so w is negative, as the tariff rises the 
subsidy to tangible debt goes up, and present saving and the current account 
1
. 12dec 1.ne. 
12 
This analysis assumes that when the tariff changes infinitesimally, the 
subsidy rate does not jump discretely. 
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4. Conclusion 
In models with only one generation of consumers, tariffs influence saving 
through changes in wealth caused by the tariff distortion. That channel of 
influence is present in our overlapping generations model with uncertain 
l 1'fespans. 13 
However, we emphasize other channels which are special in models in which 
new families are born. The tariff can change total wealth through 
redistributing income between tangible and non-tangible assets. This happens 
in the first place when tariff revenue is redistributed llllilp-sum and takes on 
the characteristics of labor income. It also occurs because tariffs change 
factor prices, which in turn alter the distribution of wealth between land and 
human wealth. 
We also ex-plore a mechanism by which the proceeds from tariffs can be 
rebated in a way to affect the incentives to hold tangible assets. We show 
that government has some scope to significantly affect the net holdings of 
international bonds while still maintaining budget balance. 
The analysis in this paper is purely positive. Conclusions about the 
welfare effects of the tariffs are not drawn, and would in general depend upon 
13 In the absence of distortions tariffs can change saving through the 
substitution effect discussed in Razin and Svensson ( 1983). The effect is 
non-zero when price indices change over time. That is ruled out here by the 
assumptions of identical felicity functions over time and constant prices. 
25 
the weights given to the utility of the different generations. 14 We are not 
able to contribute to the issue of whether tariffs should be used to alter the 
current account. 
14 Calvo and Obstfeld (1985) is a general examination of welfare issues in 
this type model. 
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Appendix 
The purpose of this appendix is to fill in some of the steps in the 
derivations discussed in the text. 
Models with Lump-Sum Subsidies 
Individuals maximize utility given by (1) subject to the budget 
constraint (2). We assume constant relative risk aversion and homothetic 
preferences, so the indirect felicity function, v, for individual i can be 
written as 
1-av.(I,p) = [I. /(1-a)Jv(p).l l 
The Hamiltonian for person i's optimization problem is given by 
H = [I.1-a/(1-a)Jv(p) + q[(r+n)w. + w + R. - I.).l. l l l 
The first-order conditions yield 
These imply 
aii/Iit = r - 0 1 
or, 
= I [(r-o)/a)(t-s)I it ise 
We use the transyersality condition 
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Using the transversality condition, we integrate the dynamic budget 
constraint (2) to get 
(l) 
I I. e-(r+n)(s-t)ds =is wit+ Nit' 
t 
where Nit is defined by 
(l) -( r+n) (s-t)R. e ds,is
t 
noting that all individuals are paid w for their labor. 
Using our expression for Iit we get 
I 
Aggregation to derive expressions for It' Nt and wt follow directly as in 
Blanchard (1985, pp. 228-229). Note that we are able to aggregate for a 
general constant relative risk aversion utility function because r is 
constant. 
The steady-state values z and 5 come directly from equations (9) and
. .
(10), setting z and b to zero and using the definition of at given in equation 
(3). 
Note that under this revenue transfer scheme, the model is linear. 
The eigenvalues of the dynamic system are given by the solution to 
( r + n - t:, -0 ) ( r - e ) = (1 - a. ) j_ n 
which yields the negative root 
e = (1/2 l [ 2r + T( -
The system is saddle stable when e is negative. 
28 
We must prove two propositions -- that saddle stability (0 < 0) implies /J. 
> r > 0, and (/J. -r) ( rt'Tt) - a/J. rr > 0. 
Note that (/J.t1t) 2 - 4a/J.1r = (/J.-1r) 2 + 4( 1-a)/J.7T. So, as long as O < a < 1, 
( ( /J. +1r) 2 - 4aA rr) 112 must be a real number. Also note that in the special case 
of free trade when a = 0, e = r -A and both propositions follow innnediately 
from e < 0. 
In general, first take the case in which 2r + ft - !J. > O. Note that this 
implies that e equals one-half of 2r + rr - A minus the positive square root of 
(/J. t Tl ) 2 - 4a/J. Tl , 
First, we will show in this case /J. > r > O. Suppose /J. < 0. Then the 
smallest that e can be is when a= 1, so that 
e = (l/2)(2r+1r-li-((A+rr} 2-4a/J.rr} 112} = r > O, 
hence a contradiction, so /J. > 0. 
Since A > 0, it follows immediately from comparing the a= 0 root (which 
equals r - /J. ) , that r - Ii < 0 < 0 , so A > r. 
Now, to show in this case that (/J.-r)(r+1r) - aA1r > O, note that we have 
(2r + rr -/J. )2 < (n + !J. ) 2 - 4aA rt • 
Multiplying out and cancelling directly yields our result. 
The second case is when 2r + rr - Ii < 0. Note first in this case that Ii > 
r directly. 
We also have 
(o-r )( r+ rr ) - aA 1r > (A- r } ( r+ 77 } - A 77 
= -rrt + r ( /J. -r) 
> -r" + r(r+n) (because 2r+rr-/J. > 0) 
= r) 0, II 
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The derivations of section 3 are straightforward until dNt/da. This 
expression can be derived directly by calculating the expression for Nt from 
its definition and using the fact that it= 0(It - I). However, an easier way 
to get it is by the back door. Note that 
dNida = ( 1/11) diida 
= [1/(1-a)ll ][I+ dz/da]. 
But, 
dzida = [ (r+11-t.) / (0+t.-n-2r)] f, 
where we have used I= (1/(1-a))z, used the definition of z from equation (11) 
(with y2 = 0), used the expression for dz/da (equation (16)), used the fact 
that dzt/da = (0 /r) (dz/da) and made the handy substitutions 
(r-o)/a = r + 11 - ~ 
and, 
0(0+t.-n-2r) = (~-r)(r+11) - a~11. 
A bit more manipulation then yields the expression for dNt/da in the text. 
The subsequent expressions in section 3a for the cases of initially free 
trade all follow directly by setting a= 0 in the more general expressions. 
Equation (17) for non-tangible wealth follows directly from the 
definitions of Nt and Rt. 
The expression for dit/dp when p = 1 initially can be derived from 
differentiating the expressions for Nt and wt noting that It= ~(at+ bt+ Nt). 
If <.> were unchanged and y
2 
= 0, as in section 3a, the derivative would be I 
exactly the one in that section. That is, we would have for the case of a= 0 
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initially 
dI/dp = [Lia'/ (r+n)] f. 
The additional term, -[nli/r(r+n)] (dc.>/dp-y
2) comes from the changes in (.) and 
(p-l)y2 in the expressions for at and Nt. 
The general expression for db/dp at the end of section 3 is derived by 
noting that 
db/dp = -0 db/dp, 
and differentiating expression (12) using 
Model with Subsidies to Tangible Assets 
Under this redistribution scheme, the effective discount rate includes a 
term, i\, which depends upon time along an equilibrium pa.th. We assume 
perfect foresight. We also assumer+ n + Bt > O. 
Setting up the problem in a way analogous to the previous section, we get 
ai. /I. = r - o + Bt1t 1t 
yielding 
Imposing the transversality condition and integrating gives 






with wt= at+ bt and Nt = Nit' 
Differentiating the expression for Nt with respect to time gives 
Using the aggregation techniques of Blanchard (1985) we get 
I
We also have 
. . . .
It= L\(wt + Nt) + ~t(wt + Nt) 
But 
so, after some cancellations, 
The expression for zt in the text is obtained by using zt = (1-a)It and 
zt = (1-a)It. The equation for wt comes from these facts and art= !\wt. 
The expression for w comes from setting wt= 0 and zt = 0 in equations 
(20) and (21). We use the fact that 
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,. 
r( (r+B-8)/a) = (r+n+B) [n (r+i3-o )/a] 
which comes from setting ar = i3w. 
The dynamic system is non-linear, but can be linearized near steady state 
as 
and 
The stable root is given by 
The system is saddle stable when A is negative. 
We need to prove that saddle stability (A < 0) implies 
rr - (r+ff-o)/a = X - r - ff= Xn(l-a) - r(r+B-8)/a > O. 
First take the case in which 2r + B + n - X > O. 
- - 2 -Then we must subtract the positive square root of (/3+7T-D.) + 4(1-a)D.rr 
from 2r + i3 + rr - X to get 2A, So, it follows that 
Cancellation yields 
Kn(l-a) - r(r+B-8)/a > O. 
The second case is when 2r + 3 + n X < O. This implies directly 
~ - r - B > r + n > O. • 
Note, we have also implicitly shown in both cases K - fl> O. 
The expression for dB /da in equation (26) comes from equation (25} . 
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